Abstract -This paper seeks to identify the characteristics that make individual U.S. banks more likely to fail or be acquired. We use bank-specific information to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We use alternative measures of productive efficiency to proxy management quality, and find that inefficiency increases the risk of failure while reducing the probability of a bank's being acquired. Finally, we show that the closer to insolvency a bank is (as reflected by a low equity-to-assets ratio) the more likely is its acquisition.
I. Introduction
S ince 1984, the number of commercial banks in the United States has fallen by one-third, reflecting first a wave of failures and then, more recently, unprecedented numbers of acquisitions and mergers. 1 Since 1984, the number of acquisitions has exceeded the number of failures four-fold, even when acquisitions of insolvent banks are counted only as failures. Federal legislation permitting interstate branch banking took effect in mid-1997, portending even more consolidation, with the possibility of a radical change in the market structure of the U.S. banking industry.
Why do some banks disappear and others survive? Several studies have sought to identify the characteristics that cause banks to fail. 2 Historically, legal impediments to branch banking tied the fortunes of banks to geographically limited markets. Sectoral shocks-for example, a sharp decline in agricultural or energy prices-brought increases in bank failures in regions hit adversely by the shocks. Not all banks would fail, however. Those with relatively illiquid, low-quality assets or little capital were more likely to fail. And, apart from excessive risk taking, or simply bad luck, banks that managed their operations inefficiently may also have been at greater risk of failing. 3 In this paper, we estimate a comprehensive model relating the probability of failure to bank characteristics, with special emphasis on management quality as reflected in alternative measures of productive efficiency. We do so in a framework that permits a bank to disappear either by failing or by being acquired by another bank.
The characteristics that affect the likelihood that a bank will be a takeover target have received comparatively little attention. One hypothesis, discussed by Hannan and Rhoades (1987) , suggests that poorly managed banks are likely targets for acquisition by bankers who think they can better manage the target's assets, and hence generate increased profits and value. Other potential motivations for mergers discussed in the literature include simply the desire to grow (to expand market power, to achieve economies of scale, or perhaps for other reasons), to diversify, and to exploit economies of scope. Finally, Hadlock et al. (1999) argue that, because regulatory barriers make hostile takeovers difficult to accomplish and thus rare in banking, the incentives of managers and directors of potential acquisition targets might also affect the probability of being acquired. For example, bank managers with a large ownership stake might push for being acquired in the hope of receiving an attractive takeover premium. On the other hand, if such managers have strong preferences for control, they may resist takeover. Indeed, Hadlock et al. find that the probability of a bank's acquisition is lower when the bank's managers have a large ownership stake, which they suggest indicates that entrenched managers block acquisitions that could be profitable for other owners.
A number of studies have investigated the impact of actual mergers on bank performance ex post. 4 Besides Hadlock et al., however, we are aware of just two other studies that compare the characteristics of bank takeover targets with nontargets. Amel and Rhoades (1989) find that the higher a bank's earnings, the less likely it is to be acquired. Hannan and Rhoades (1987) , however, like Hadlock et al., find no relationship between earnings and the probability of acquisition. The relationship between a bank's performance ex ante and the likelihood of its acquisition thus remains an open question.
In this paper, we build on previous studies of the characteristics affecting the probability of a bank's being acquired in three ways:
1. We include additional measures of managerial performance that might affect the likelihood of being acquired; 2. we use a competing-risks model to consider explicitly the joint determination of the probability of being acquired and of failing (the acquisition of a poorly managed bank, for example, might prevent a failure); and 3. we employ a much larger sample of banks than have previous studies, using all banks (with usable data) in existence in 1984 with at least $50 million of assets.
Management quality is difficult to measure directly because it can take several forms. A considerable literature has developed on the measurement of productive efficiency in banking, however, which conceivably reflects management quality. Researchers have found that banks in general suffer from considerable managerial, or ''X-,'' inefficiency, as opposed to scale or scope inefficiency. 5 However, managerial inefficiency can be measured in a number of ways. In this paper, we use some typical measures of productive inefficiency constructed using two of the most popular techniques as proxies for management quality.
Because banks may disappear through either failure or acquisition-and because occurrence of either event precludes the other-we use a competing-risks hazard model framework to identify characteristics leading to each outcome. Unlike more commonly used discrete-outcome models, hazard models make more-efficient use of the data by explicitly incorporating information about the timing of alternative outcomes.
Our empirical model is based on the measures that regulators use to evaluate banks: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity. We find that highly leveraged banks, banks with low earnings, low liquidity, or risky asset portfolios are more likely to fail than other banks. Holding other factors constant, we find that banks located in states that permit branching are less likely to fail, suggesting that geographic diversification can limit failures. And, finally, we find strong evidence that managerial inefficiency increases the likelihood of bank failure.
We also find that proximity to insolvency strongly affects the likelihood that a bank will be acquired. All else equal, the less well capitalized a bank is, the greater the probability that it will be acquired, suggesting the acquisition of some banks just before they become insolvent. We also find that banks with low earnings, low liquidity, or relatively high nonperforming loan ratios are less attractive takeover targets. Banks located in states permitting branching, as well as small banks in general, have been more likely to be acquired. And, finally, we find that inefficient banks are less likely to be acquired, controlling for leverage and other balance sheet and environmental characteristics. Managerial inefficiency could reflect excessive use of, or payment for, physical plant or labor, or excessive deposit interest cost. The cost of reorganizing an inefficient bank could thus be high. 6 Moreover, managerial inefficiency might be taken as a signal of potential problems that are themselves unobservable (for example, bad loans or accounting irregularities). Thus, holding other portfolio and environmental conditions constant, acquirers on average apparently prefer not to purchase inefficient banks.
The next section describes a hazard model of failures and acquisitions and the data used to control for portfolio characteristics and other factors. Section III presents the results of the hazard estimation, and a discussion of conclusions drawn from our estimation is given in section IV. Technical details of the hazard estimation are discussed in appendix A. Appendix B describes productive efficiency and the measures we use to proxy management quality. We also discuss the data used to measure efficiency and the results of the efficiency estimation in appendix B.
II. Modeling the Time-To-Disappearance
We examine the hazard, or risk, of banks disappearing due either to acquisition or to failure (which we refer to as events in the following discussion). We assume that the causal processes for acquisitions and failures are different. As shown below, our empirical results support this assumption.
Either acquisition or failure removes a bank from risk of the other event-which has been labelled competing risks in the duration-model literature. Conceivably, failure and acquisition times depend on one another (for example, if banks are acquired just before they would otherwise have failed). Without additional information, however, any dependent competing-risks model is observationally equivalent to an independent competing-risks model in that, for each dependent model, there will be a corresponding independent model with the same likelihood value. In other words, dependent hazards can be modeled using appropriate multivariate distributions, but the data are unable to distinguish between dependent and independent models. One cannot test the null hypothesis of independence, or test hypotheses about the structure of the dependence. 7 Thus, we estimate separate, independent hazards for failure and acquisition. (See appendix A for technical details.) We do address the issue of dependence between the failure and acquisition hazards, however, by including a key indicator of failurethe ratio of equity to assets-in the acquisition hazard. This provides a test of whether proximity to failure affects the likelihood of a bank's acquisition, and is consistent with the approach suggested by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980, pp. 5 Berger and Humphrey (1991) is perhaps the most important article in this literature. See Berger and Humphrey (1997) or Berger et al. (1993) for recent surveys.
6 Large layoffs of personnel or branch closings are sometimes necessary to improve a bank's efficiency. Perhaps because such actions can entail considerable cost, both monetarily and in terms of public relations, studies have generally found few cost-efficiency gains associated with acquisitions and mergers of banks. Akhavein et al. (1997) , for example, find that recent mergers of large bank holding companies have improved profit efficiency, but not cost efficiency.
7 See Elandt-Johnson and Johnson (1980) and Lancaster (1990) for proofs; Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980, pp. 172-175) provide an example. While it would certainly be possible to specify and estimate a model of dependent hazards, any conclusions from such an exercise are likely to depend heavily on the assumed, untestable correlation structure. See Mouchart and Rolin (1995) for additional discussion of this point.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 175-177) to account for dependence among competing risks. We use Cox (1972) proportional-hazard models with time-varying covariates, estimated by maximizing the partiallikelihood function, to examine the disappearance of banks. The estimation is semiparametric because no baseline hazard is specified. In modeling the failure hazard, acquired banks are treated as censored at the date of acquisition; in modeling the acquisition hazard, banks that failed are treated as censored at their failure date. 8 This approach assumes that censoring does not provide any information about latent failure times beyond that available in the covariates, and is standard in much applied work (for example, Katz and Meyer, 1990) .
A. Operating Effıciency as a Measure of Management Performance
In choosing covariates for the hazard models, we attempt to account for capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity, and miscellaneous factors. Of these, management quality is perhaps the most difficult to observe and hence to measure. We employ three measures of inefficiency as proxies for management quality:
M1 ϭ cost inefficiency. Each variable is constructed so that larger values reflect greater inefficiency. If productive inefficiency contributes to failure, we expect the coefficients on each variable to be positive in the failure hazard.
There are various notions of productive efficiency, as well as different techniques for measuring each type of inefficiency. (See Lovell (1993) for discussion.) The two efficiency concepts and estimation methods we employ are among the most widely used. Specifically, we use a parametric stochastic frontier model to estimate cost inefficiency, and nonparametric distance functions to estimate input and output technical inefficiency. Although Berger and Humphrey (1991) find that technical inefficiencies comprise the vast majority of cost inefficiency in banks, the parametric and nonparametric estimation methodologies have led to very different estimates of efficiency (for example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) ). By using two different efficiency concepts and estimation methods, we can compare how well these measures relate to market outcomes, and whether they yield useful information for predicting failures and acquisitions.
Banks use a number of inputs to produce myriad financial services, and, to measure productive efficiency, researchers are forced to employ simplified models of bank production. We adopt the common view of banks as financial intermediaries that transform financial resources, labor, and physical capital into various types of loans and other financial assets. 9 Researchers have used various criteria to identify the specific inputs and outputs to include in models of bank production. We define inputs, outputs, input prices, and variable costs as in Kaparakis et al. (1994) , which is somewhat representative. 10 Our cost efficiency variable, M1, is obtained by independently estimating cross-sectional translog cost functions for each quarter. We specify a composite-error structure consisting of a normal error representing noise and a one-sided, half-normal error representing cost inefficiency. Maximumlikelihood estimates are obtained along the lines of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) ; the inefficiency term is estimated for each firm in the sample by computing the conditional expectation of the half-normal term conditional on the estimated composite error as described by Jondrow et al. (1982) .
To obtain nonparametric estimates of technical efficiency, we use Shephard (1970) input and output distance functions based on the same inputs and outputs on which our cost functions are based. Similar to our use of the cost function, the distance functions are estimated separately for each quarter. 11 Both the input distance-function estimator, D i in , and the output distance-function estimator, D i out , measure the radial distance from an observed point (x i , y i ) to the boundary of the convex hull of the sample observations, are uniquely determined, and are invariant with respect to units of measurement. The input distance-function estimates the maximum feasible proportionate reduction in inputs, subject to the existing technology, holding outputs fixed. By definition, D i in Ն 1, with D i in ϭ 1 indicating that bank i is 9 See Berger et al. (1987) or Ferrier and Lovell (1990) for further discussion of banks' activities. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide an extensive survey of efficiency studies in banking and discuss some of the data constraints. 10 The outputs are: loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenses (Y 1 ); real estate loans (Y 2 ); commercial and industrial loans (Y 3 ); and federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell, plus total securities held in trading accounts (Y 4 ). The variable inputs are: interest-bearing deposits except certificates of deposit greater than $100,000 (X 1 ); purchased funds (certificates of deposit greater than $100,000, federal funds purchased, and securities sold plus demand notes) and other borrowed money (X 2 ); number of employees (X 3 ); and book value of premises and fixed assets (X 4 ). In addition, we define a quasi-fixed input (X 0 ) consisting of noninterest-bearing deposits. Our computation of input prices and variable costs is identical to that in Kaparakis et al. and other studies. 11 Our use of input and output distance functions assumes that the underlying production set is closed and convex, that all production requires use of some inputs, and that both inputs and outputs are strongly disposable. In addition, we allow for variable returns to scale. Färe et al., 1994) . The measures we have chosen are representative of those used in the banking literature. (For example, see Ferrier and Lovell (1990) , Barr et al. (1993) , and Wheelock and Wilson (1995) .) For a survey of this literature, see Berger and Humphrey (1997).) Because no parametric assumptions are required, the DEA approach offers more-flexible forms of the technology and distributions of inefficiency than does estimation of the translog cost function. The DEA methods do not allow for noise, however, and any noise in the underlying datagenerating process will be confused with inefficiency. Apart from this problem, DEA methods give consistent estimates of inefficiency under appropriate assumptions about the underlying data-generating process, but suffer from the usual statistical inefficiency problems incurred in nonparametric estimation (Kneip et al. (1998) ). 14 Appendix B presents additional detail about the estimation of cost and technical inefficiency, as well as a comparison of mean values of inefficiency for failing, acquired, and surviving (that is, never failed or acquired) banks in each year [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . We find that, on average, failing banks were more cost-and technically inefficient than survivors, while acquired banks were less cost-inefficient, and neither more nor less technically inefficient than survivors. Such comparisons, of course, do not control for other characteristics that could affect the probability of a bank's failure or acquisition, and thus we estimate the hazard models to better understand why some banks fail or are acquired while others survive independently. 15 
B. Hazard Model Specification
In contrast to measures of productive inefficiency, the other variables used in the hazard models are fairly standard and, together with M1-M3, attempt to capture the components of the CAMEL ratings assigned by regulators in their evaluations of individual banks 16 :
Capital adequacy:
CAPAD ϭ total equity/total assets. Asset quality:
A1 ϭ total loans/total assets. A2 ϭ real estate loans/total loans. A3 ϭ commercial and industrial loans/total loans. A4 ϭ other real estate owned/total assets. A5 ϭ income earned, but not collected on loans/ total assets. A6 ϭ nonperforming loans/total assets. 17 Earnings:
EARN ϭ net income after taxes/total assets. Liquidity:
LIQ ϭ (federal funds purchased Ϫ fed funds sold)/ total assets. Miscellaneous factors:
SIZE ϭ log of total assets. HOLD ϭ 1 if 25% or more of equity is held by a multibank holding company; 0 otherwise. BR1 ϭ 1 if bank is located in a state allowing limited branching; 0 otherwise. BR2 ϭ 1 if bank is located in a state allowing unlimited branching; 0 otherwise. 18 AGE ϭ log of bank's age in years.
Our data come from the quarterly Statements of Income and Condition (call reports) filed by commercial banks. We use end-of-quarter data for banks with at least $50 million of assets operating in 1984(3); data are updated quarterly through 1993(4), for a total of 38 quarters. Aside from failure or acquisition, some banks disappear from the dataset simply because of missing call reports. Banks with missing 12 If D i in ϭ 1, then bank i lies on the boundary of the convex hull of the sample observations; this may or may not correspond to the true boundary of the underlying production set. See Simar and Wilson (1998) for a bootstrap approach to estimating confidence intervals for distance functions and a discussion of statistical issues associated with distance function estimators.
13 Shephard (1970) and Färe (1988) discuss economic assumptions underlying the distance-function estimators, while Lovell (1993) discusses DEA methods in general.
14 This implies that, even if the data-generating process does not involve a noise process, DEA methods may yield noisy, imprecise estimates of inefficiency in finite samples due to sampling variation. 15 Estimated inefficiency might be correlated with failure (or acquisition) for several reasons. Inefficiency could reflect poor cost management, but might also reflect bad luck (for example, if a bank had to expend significant resources to work out problem loans caused by a regional recession). Berger and DeYoung (1997) find evidence of such two-way causality between inefficiency and nonperforming loans, indicating that one should be cautious about interpreting a close correlation between inefficiency and failure as supporting a particular hypothesis. Although statistically significant, the simple correlations between nonperforming loans (variable A6) and our inefficiency measures (M1, M2, and M3) are quite low (Ϫ0.06, Ϫ0.10, and 0.02, respectively). Moreover, by controlling for nonperforming loans and other measures of asset quality, we can better glean the impact of mismanagement, as reflected by inefficiency, on the likelihood of failure and acquisition. Of course, correlation among covariates in the hazard function, or even a causal relationship among some covariates, is of no consequence for estimation purposes because the hazard is conditioned on these covariates.
16 Some of the variables specified below may be endogenous with respect to failure or acquisition times in the sense defined by Lancaster (1990, p. 28) . As discussed in appendix A, however, use of the partial-likelihood approach to estimate the hazards avoids problems associated with this endogeneity. 17 This variable includes past due, nonaccrual loans, lease financing receivables, and securities, less any guaranteed portion. See Call Report schedule RC-N. 18 The source of branching information is the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Profiles of State Chartered Banking, various issues.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS call reports for three consecutive quarters are treated as censored on the day before the date of their first missing call report, unless they failed or were acquired within those three quarters. Unfortunately, for many banks that fail, call reports are unavailable for several quarters before their failure date. When call reports are not available within three quarters of a bank's failure (or acquisition) date, we also treat the bank as censored. This avoids biasing the hazard model results by using information from the distant past to describe characteristics of banks at the time of their failure or acquisition, and is conservative in the sense that, to the extent we treat failed or acquired banks as censored, significance levels for hazard-model coefficients are reduced. 19 Additional details of the hazard-estimation procedure can be found in appendix A. In estimating the failure hazard, we expect the coefficient on CAPAD to have a negative sign, indicating that banks with higher equity as a percentage of total assets should be less likely to fail. Obviously, the less equity a bank has, the less protection it has against loan losses or other declines in the value of its assets.
Loans are typically the least liquid and most risky of bank assets. Thus, we expect that the more concentrated a bank's assets are in loans, the greater the likelihood of failure; hence, we expect a positive coefficient on A1. In the absence of direct information about the riskiness or quality of a bank's loan portfolio, we include two measures of loan concentration by category and three measures of loan portfolio performance. We include the ratios of real estate loans to total loans, and of commercial and industrial loans to total loans, to test whether concentration in either category affects the probability of failure. The variables A4, A5, and A6 are indicators of asset quality. ''Other real estate owned'' reflects foreclosed property, and higher values could indicate problem loans. Similarly, a high level of earned, but uncollected, loan income might also indicate that the quality of a bank's loan portfolio is low, as would a high ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets. Thus, the coefficients on A4, A5, and A6 are expected to be positive.
Banks with greater earnings are, presumably, less likely to fail, and hence we expect a negative coefficient on EARN. Positive values of LIQ indicate net purchases of federal funds, which might indicate illiquidity. If illiquid banks are more likely to fail, the coefficient on LIQ should be positive. 20 We use the log of total assets to measure bank size. Casual empiricism suggests that small banks may be more likely to fail. If this remains true after controlling for other factors, the coefficient on SIZE should be negative. We include HOLD to test whether membership in a multibank holding company affects the probability of failure. For example, if a parent company injects cash into a weak subsidiary, holding company membership might lessen the chance of failure. On the other hand, the failure of a lead bank in a holding company has sometimes led regulators to close all holding company members. Although we are uncertain about the likely sign on HOLD, including it in the hazard model should lead to more-precise estimates of the coefficients of the remaining variables. We include branching dummy variables to test whether the opportunity to branch enhances geographic diversification and thereby lessens the chance of failure. If so, the coefficients on BR1 and BR2 should be negative. Finally, we control for bank age, which could reflect management experience, charter value, or some other unobservable that might affect the likelihood of failure. We define AGE as the log of a bank's age in years, because the effect of time since opening should diminish beyond the first few years of life.
In estimating the hazard models, we define bank failure in two ways. First, we treat only those banks that were closed by the FDIC as failed. Some banks, however, were allowed to remain in operation for some time after becoming insolvent-in some cases operating for several quarters with negative equity. Because of regulatory action, the precise timing of failure is sometimes arbitrary. Hence, our second definition of bank failure expands on the first to also include banks with total equity capital less goodwill divided by total assets of less than two percent. For these banks, the failure date is taken as the earlier of the reported date of closure or the day before the call report on which the equity ratio is observed below two percent. 21 We are unaware of any studies that attempt to estimate acquisition hazards. As a starting point, we use the same variables as in our failure-hazard specifications. Casual observation again suggests that small banks are more likely takeover targets, and so we expect a negative sign on SIZE. With respect to the management variables, buyers may look for poorly managed banks whose values could be enhanced by superior management. Inefficient banks represent such opportunities, so we might expect a positive sign on M1-M3 in the acquisition hazards. Indeed, Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that, in a sample of acquisitions by large bank holding companies, the acquirer was typically more efficient than the acquired firm. The acquisition of poorly managed banks may entail substantial costs of reorganization, however, and poor management may signal other (perhaps 19 Data on 4,022 banks are used in the hazard-model estimation. Of these, 231 banks failed, and 1,380 were acquired between September 30, 1984, and March 31, 1994 . Numerical problems precluded the estimation of technical efficiency scores for a few banks, reducing the number of banks in the hazard models that include technical efficiency to 3,972. Of these, 230 failed and 1,367 were acquired during the same period as above. Although we were able to estimate efficiency for more banks (see appendix B), missing observations on other variables reduced the number of banks available for hazard-model estimation. 20 Unfortunately, missing data for many banks prevented use of a broader measure of liquidity including currency, coin, and U.S. Treasury securities, as well as net fed funds purchased. 21 An additional 51 banks are identified as failed under this expanded definition, although the timing of other failures is affected. We choose two percent as our criteria since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 requires regulators to close or impose prompt corrective action on any bank whose equity ratio falls below two percent.
WHY DO BANKS DISAPPEAR?
hidden) problems, such as bad loans, and thus discourage potential acquirers. Hence, the effect of managerial inefficiency on the acquisition hazard is an empirical question. 22 Our data on bank acquisitions include information on the type of acquisition, banks involved, date of acquisition, and whether the acquisition was arranged by the FDIC in the case of failed banks. In estimating the acquisition hazard, we exclude acquisitions of insolvent (or nearly insolvent) banks arranged by the FDIC. For some acquired banks, however, failure may have been imminent. When we use our second, expanded definition of bank failure, we treat acquired banks as failed if their equity ratio falls below the two-percent level before the reported date of acquisition. Consequently, in the acquisition hazard, such banks are treated as censored.
III. Hazard Estimation Results

A. Time To Failure
The estimation results for the time-to-failure hazard function are reported in table 1. Results for three pairs of equations are shown, corresponding to the three measures of inefficiency. Within each pair, two definitions of failure are used: closure by the FDIC, and an equity/asset ratio below 0.02. Equation (I) and (II) include cost inefficiency (M1) as a proxy for management quality; equation (III) and (IV) include input technical efficiency (M2), while equation (V) and (VI) include the output technical efficiency measure (M3).
The qualitative results appear robust across both the different specifications and the failure definitions; signs and significance levels are similar in all six equations. A positive sign indicates that an increase in the relevant variable is associated with an increase in the failure hazard, while a negative sign indicates that an increase in the relevant variable is associated with a decrease in the failure hazard. The financial variables affect the probability of failure 22 Some acquisitions result from holding-company reorganizations. To the extent that these reorganizations have little to do with efficiency of the ''acquired'' bank, we would expect the statistical significance of the efficiency variables M1-M3 and perhaps that of other variables to be reduced. Similarly, statistical significance also might be reduced by our treatment of banks that are acquired by holding companies, but not merged immediately into another bank within the holding company, as ''survivors,'' if the characteristics of such banks are more like those of banks that are merged, that is, treated as ''acquired'' in our analysis. Single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 0.1; double asterisk (**) denotes significance at 0.05.
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largely as anticipated. For example, the less well capitalized a bank was, the more likely it was to fail. By the same token, failure was more likely for banks with larger ratios of loans to assets (A1) and for banks with higher ratios of commercial and industrial loans to total assets (A3). The proxies for loan performance-other real estate owned to total assets (A4), uncollected loan income to assets (A5), and the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (A6)-are all strongly significant. Not surprisingly, failure probability was negatively related to earnings. The coefficient on the liquidity variable is counter to expectations, however, perhaps indicating that it is a poor proxy. We find no robustly significant relationships between size or holding company membership and the probability of failure, but we do find that failure was less likely in states permitting either limited or statewide branching. Apparently the geographic diversification afforded by branching reduced the likelihood of failure, holding individual bank characteristics fixed.
The cost inefficiency variable M1 and the input technical inefficiency variable M2 both have positive and statistically significant coefficients. The positive signs indicate thatholding capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and other factors constant-the more inefficient a bank was (that is, the lower management quality was), the more likely it was to fail. The t-ratios for M2 are lower than those for M1, and are insignificant for M3, reflecting at least in part the incorporation of noise into the nonparametric efficiency scores as discussed in section II and appendix B. Our results support previous research, as well as intuition, however, that managerial inefficiency increases the likelihood that a bank will fail.
B. Time to Acquisition
Next, we investigate whether the same variables that explain time to failure can also explain time to acquisition. Table 2 reports these results. Again, we distinguish among alternative types of inefficiency, as well as definitions of failure (failures are treated as censored observations in the model of acquisition).
In general, we find that the lower a bank's equity/asset ratio, the more likely it was to be acquired. As the results in table 1 illustrate, banks with little equity relative to assets are at significantly greater risk of failure than other banks. Thus, Single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 0.1; double (**) asterisk denotes significance at 0.05.
WHY DO BANKS DISAPPEAR?
finding a negative relationship between the equity/asset ratio and the probability of acquisition could be interpreted as the closer a bank is to failure, the more likely it is to be acquired. This does not, however, imply that failure is imminent for all banks that are acquired, though it may be for some. Especially skillful managers might be able to operate banks safely with little capital, and such banks might be highly profitable or desirable takeover candidates for other reasons. Nevertheless, thinly capitalized banks are generally at greater risk of failure and, apparently, also of being acquired.
Our results also indicate that banks with suspect loans-as reflected by high ratios of other real estate owned to total assets (A4) and of interest earned by not collected to total assets (A5)-were, unsurprisingly, less likely to be acquired. On the other hand, we find that a lower rate of return on assets increased a bank's likelihood of being acquired, consistent with the relationship between earnings and acquisition found by Amel and Rhoades (1989) , but in contrast to the findings of Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Hadlock et al. (1999) .
Holding other variables constant, smaller banks were more likely to be acquired than larger banks. Members of holding companies were also more likely to be acquired, reflecting the consolidation of banks within holding companies; banks located in branch-banking states also were more likely to be acquired, which of course is not surprising. We also find that older banks were less likely to be acquired, all else being equal.
Finally, we find that cost inefficiency reduced the probability of being acquired, all else equal. Inefficiency may discourage potential acquirers because of the costs of reorganizing an inefficient bank, or because inefficiency might signal hidden problems with the bank's operations. Indeed, for given financial characteristics and key environmental variables, our results indicate that managerial inefficiency reduces the attractiveness of banks to acquirers. 23 Acquisition appears unrelated to technical inefficiency, however, at least as measured by the input and output distance functions. Because cost inefficiency and technical inefficiency are related concepts, the insignificance of M2 and M3 in the acquisition hazard may reflect noise in these measures. 24
IV. Conclusions
The U.S. banking system is in a period of transition. From the mid-1930s through the 1970s, banking markets were insulated, bank profits were stable, and the regulatory and technological environment in which banks operated changed little. Since 1980, however, significant changes have increased competition and begun to alter the market structure of the banking industry. The number of U.S. banks has fallen sharply since 1985, initially because of failures, but more recently because of high numbers of acquisitions and mergers. We have sought to identify the characteristics of banks exiting the industry through either failure or acquisition, focusing especially on how managerial inefficiency might affect the likelihood of either outcome.
We find, not surprisingly, that less well capitalized banks are at greater risk of failure, as are banks with high ratios of loans to assets and evidence of poor-quality loan portfolios, and banks with low earnings. Given bank-specific characteristics, we find that banks located in states where branching is permitted had a lower probability of failing, supporting the claim that enhanced freedoms to branch would afford banks greater diversification and thereby reduce their vulnerability to localized economic shocks.
We also find that, after controlling for other determinants, the lower a bank's capitalization, the greater the probability that it would be acquired. This is consistent with the acquisition of failing banks prior to insolvency, but also with the purchase of banks with skillful managers who are able to operate successfully with high leverage. We find, however, that the probability of acquisition declined with higher return on assets. The likelihood of acquisition also was higher for banks located in states permitting statewide branching, suggesting that industry consolidation may accelerate with the end of interstate branching restrictions.
Finally, we find that the probability of failure was higher for managerially inefficient banks, as reflected in measures of both cost and technical inefficiency. The likelihood of acquisition, however, declined with cost inefficiency, and we detect no clear relationship of acquisition with technical inefficiency. Although inefficient banks might be ripe for takeover by owners who could enhance their management quality (and thereby their value), we find that, on average, high cost inefficiency has lowered the probability that a bank will be acquired. Indeed, other studies have found little cost efficiency gain associated with large-bank acquisitions. Apparently, the costs of reorganizing an inefficient bank and the potential for other hidden problems that inefficiency might signal tend to discourage the acquisition of inefficient banks. 23 This might also explain why Akhavein et al. (1997) find little improvement in cost efficiency following the merger of very large banks, despite the observed potential for large improvement. 24 As noted in appendix B, the slow convergence rates of the nonparametric efficiency estimators used to define M2 and M3 imply that our technical efficiency estimates from the quarterly cross-sections used in this study will have high variance due to sampling variation. This amounts to a measurement-error problem, whose treatment is beyond the scope of the present paper. To the extent that variables in the hazard models contain noise, we would expect an attenuation effect as with other measurementerror problems that would reduce significance levels.
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where l (t) is the baseline hazard. Substituting this into equation (A.3), taking logs, and summing across individuals yields the partial loglikelihood for event l for the entire sample:
The baseline hazard drops out when equation (A.4) is substituted into (A.3); the model is semiparametric in the sense that the parameter vector ␤ l is estimated without specifying the baseline hazard. In principal, although the baseline hazard l (t) varies only over t and not over i, it is evaluated at different times t for different banks i and therefore captures individual heterogeneity among banks disappearing at different times. The advantage of the partial-likelihood estimation approach in our case lies in the fact that only part of the hazard function need be specified; we do not have to specify the baseline hazard, nor do we need to define the density or survivor functions. 25 This last point is particularly germane for our purposes, as some of the covariates we use to specify the failure and acquisition hazards are likely endogenous with respect to the disappearance times t J i . Consequently, probability densities and survivor functions conditional on the covariate path x(t) through time are not defined. However, the hazard function conditional on the covariate path is always defined, even if corresponding (conditional) density and survivor functions do not exist. 26 Therefore, using the partial-likelihood approach, we are able to directly estimate parameters of the hazard function in equation (A.4) while the need to specify density and survivor functions, which do not exist due to endogeneity of our time-varying covariates. As Lancaster (1990) observes, this merely reflects the fact that the hazard function is much more fundamental in modeling duration data than density or survivor functions.
APPENDIX B
Efficiency Estimation Results
Estimation of the frontier translog cost functions for each quarter is straightforward, although computationally burdensome. 27 We estimate a series of cross-sectional relationships rather than a panel data model to allow for the possibility that inefficiency varies over time. The parameter estimates for the cost functions vary a great deal over the 32 quarters in which convergence was achieved, suggesting that the technology shifted over time. This calls into question alternative methods that hold technology constant over time. Annual estimates of cost efficiency are derived for all banks with usable data. 28 Mean estimates of cost efficiency for banks 25 For purposes of hypothesis testing, the partial log-likelihood (A.5) may be regarded as an ordinary log-likelihood concentrated with respect to the baseline hazard; see Andersen and Gill (1982) and Johansen (1983) . Efron (1977) discusses the efficiency loss from using the partial likelihood as opposed to the full information likelihood. 26 See Lancaster (1990, pp. 21-32 ) for a detailed discussion of this point. 27 We used procedures contained in LIMDEP version 6.0 to compute the cost-function estimates. See the LIMDEP Version 6.0 User's Manual and Reference Guide, Econometric Software, Inc., Bellport, NY (1992) . Nonparametric estimates were computed using Fortran code written by the authors. The call reports contain information on banks whose business does not involve the traditional banking operations reflected in our input/output mapping (for example, credit-card banks), and nonparametric efficiency measures in particular are sensitive to outliers in the data. We therefore employ several selection criteria to limit our sample to a group of relatively homogenous banks. In particular, we omit banks with foreign branches; banks with nonpositive values for inputs, outputs, or prices; and banks reporting assets of less than $50 million (1986 dollars). Because some remaining observations contain values for P 1 and P 2 that are suspect, we omit observations when either of these variables exceeded 0.45. We arrived at this criteria by examining the distributions of the price variables; the distributions were somewhat continuous up to some point below 0.45, with a few (clearly implausible) large outliers in the right tail. 28 We omit the parameter estimates to conserve space; the actual values are available on request. In the six quarters in which convergence was not achieved, initial ordinary least-squares estimation (to obtain starting values) yielded residuals skewed in the correct direction; hence, failure to achieve convergence in these quarters may reflect poor starting values rather than specification problems. (See Greene (1993) .) In principle, one could specify a correlation structure relating the cost-function parameter across time; however, given the volume of our data, this appears computationally infeasible at present. For the quarters in which the cost function could not be estimated, M1 is set equal to its value in the previous quarter when the hazard models are estimated. This is entirely within the spirit of time-varying covariates hazard models, since we update variables (2) is reported in the column labeled ''Survived.'' Mean cost efficiency for banks that failed or were acquired within one year of the given quarter are reported in the columns labeled ''Failed'' and ''Acquired.'' The number of observations varies over time because data for two successive years are needed to compile cost figures for each bank, and many banks have missing data for one or more of the required variables in any given quarter. 29 For each period, we use the bootstrap procedure described by Atkinson and Wilson (1995) with 1,000 replications to test for significant differences in mean efficiency measures for failed versus survived banks and acquired versus survived banks. Asterisks in Consistent with Berger and Humphrey (1992a) and others, we find that failing banks almost always were more cost-inefficient than surviving banks, although in several periods the differences in mean inefficiency are not statistically significant. By contrast, acquired banks were, on average, almost always less inefficient than survivors, and the differences in mean inefficiency between acquired and surviving banks are almost always statistically significant. There may well be other important characteristics that affect the likelihood that a bank will be acquired, but it appears that cost-inefficient banks are less likely to be acquired than efficient banks.
To compute the input and output distance-function estimates of technical efficiency, corresponding linear programs are each solved once for each bank in each cross-section. In doing so, efficiency for the ith bank at time t is measured relative to the convex hull of observations on the N t banks observed at time t. Table B .2 and B.3 report means for the nonparametric measures of technical inefficiency. (In table B .3, we report means of the inverse output efficiency measure to facilitate comparison with the other efficiency measures.) In contrast to the cost-inefficiency results, failing banks often appear less technically inefficient than surviving banks. Of course, this analysis does not control for other possible determinants of failure, but, from this comparison, failing banks do not appear consistently more technically inefficient than surviving banks. As with the cost-inefficiency estimates reported in table B.1, we find that acquired banks were less whenever new information becomes available. Although this may introduce measurement error, no alternative is evident if parametric efficiency estimates are to be used. 29 For purposes of estimating efficiency, the number of observations in each quarter ranges from 2,967 to 5,530. Table B .1, however, reports means for just those banks used in the hazard-model estimation. Some banks for which we could estimate efficiency had missing values for other variables that precluded their use in the hazard-model estimation. In addition, whereas all banks in existence in a given year were used to estimate efficiency, the hazard-model estimation used only those banks operating at the beginning of our sample period (1984(3) ).
30 Small numbers of observations for failed banks in each quarter, together with nonnormality of the efficiency scores, precludes use of conventional t-ratios. 
